FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT-

ISSUE: ONGOING MELTDOWN PROCESS IN 3 REACTOR BLOCKS

Incident history: (uncorrected draft)

On March 11- 2011 , reportedly Japan`s automatic Earthquake detection system triggered and automatic shutdown process in several nuclear power plants along the coast of Honshu, after a 9.0 magnitude Earthquake had occured offshore Honshu at 05:46:23 UTC ( 14:46:23 Uhr local time) . It was not reported, whether the Onagawa_Nuclear_Power_Plant als was shut down by that automatic, but its position close to the epicenter would assume, it would have been shutdown.

The other explanation why any fire broke out soon after the earthquake had happened, would be that it was kept online as the power plant which supplies other nuclear plants with electricity.The fire was reported, shortly before the Tsunami hit the island. It was reported, that the tranformer building cought fire what is typical for an so called overvoltage after a Sun SME or here: if or 3 line shortcut has occured, here most likely caused by the Earthquake itself or when the Tsunami wave hit the power grid.

The nuclear power complex of Fukushima in 177 km ( 109 miles) distance from the offshore epicenter consists out of 6 reactor blocks with 1 elder 360 MW boiling water reactor built by General Electrics in 1971 and 5 other 720 MW boiling water Reactors built later by Japans Toshiba. When the Earthquake occured, 3 reactor were online. Reactor Nr 4 whad been emptied due to a revision. which had just been completed before by German engineers The 90- 100 tons fuel element had been stored along with elder spent fuel rods in the reactors spent fuel rod storage pool, most unfortunataly built in a store above the reactor block. Reportedly this nuclear fuel rods were not yet inserted back into the reactor core when the incident began.

The emergency shutdown system in a nuclear plant , consists out of a motor below the reactor which drives in the called "control rods" which absorb and stop the neutron flow ( and is the only but normally also safe " only possibility to stop an ongoing nuclear fission) and a triple system of pumps , sprinkling systems and heat exchangers which cool the " after decay heat" in the reactor core during shutdow

Most likely ( the only explanation for the later course of the incident) BEFORE the shutdown process was completed , the entire system stopped working. Due to TEPCO reports, the failuree was caused by a total electric outage, But since it turned out ( when TEPCO tried to restore electricity) that all internal devices in all plants dont work naymore , it must be assumed that an overvoltage was the cause of the outage and destroyed all these devices. All official report including the US ones still cleim that the emergency shutdown was successfully completed and the overheating began because of the wellknown effect of "after decay heat" ( of the fissioned Isotopes) hwich has to be colled during shutdown but actually wasn`r due to the pump failure after the electric outage. This version is rather doubtable out of some propositions which just are not true;

Most likeley ( as I believe) the shutdown process came to an halt before completed. TEPCO claimed in its video, that first the regular emergency cooling system, which pumps water through the reactor cores through the only and primary water cycle (in whichduring production the produced steam runs through the turbines and generators and then condensed back into the reactorn cores) failed working due to the electric outage. Then Tepoc says the Diesel powered generators started and the second colling system - a sprinkler started to work but failed also soon after. Then TEPCO says the third cooling systems ( a heat exchanger amd steam condensator) started to work and colled the reacor for abiut 1 hour., The emeregncy electricity gernators faild " when the tsunami" hit the island 1 HOUR LATER " and drowned the generators with water what caused them to fail as well. . At this point, TE PCOs informations must be doubted , since Fukushima is in just 177 km distance to the epicenter and the Tsunami must have reached the island already about 7- 9 minutes later. Also Japan built the most earthquake safe buildings in the world and the huge seaquake did not harm any of the buldings or installations at Fukushimna as the japonese military reported after flying over Fumkushima one hour after the Tsunami hit. Tsunamis happen as regularly as Earthquakes do and some in the past ( after weaker qaueks ) towered up to 40 meters. So its just not really believable that the Japonese who are so accurate in all what they do whould not have thought about that risk and mounted their emergency generators inside a waterproofed part of the plant. The report ends that still some batteries ( which supply do to the cirsumstances electricity for a half day and have much more capacity than those in Western reactors) supllied that colling system for hours, after the " after decay heat" would have sunk below critical temperatures and values

Most scientist agree that it needs in a usual 1400 or 1600 MW Reactor as in Germanyto doll the reactor core at least 6 hours after shutdown . After this 6 hours they say- the "after decay heat" would have sunk below uncritical temperatures and values those cannot cause a meltdown or serious damage to the fuekl and control rods. In this time the temperature also would not rise but steady drop...The first ive reports however reported for hours that the batteries were still working . they worked for hours most probably until the next day ( when Reactor 1 exploded) . Also as each reactor in Fukushima has only the half capacity and therefor also half fuel content than any German reactor the decay heat would be lower and the unciritical temperature might or must(?) therefor have been achieved earlier.

So most likely the subsequent cause of the incident was not caused by the " Isotope after decay heat" but by an uncompleted shutdown process. With the control rods not driven in completely the nuclear fission in the uppper partsof the fuel rod installation( where the nuclear fission between the fuel rods was therefore not interrupted by the neutron absorber) continued. If all the cooling systems failed, these upper portion in the reactors fuel rods started to overheat and melted most likely just 90 minutes e later . The latest report of the Japonese government in May 2011 confirmed that the partial meltdown indeed began soon after the quake and the failed shutdown already on March 11 ( what supports my thesis) The melt dropped down inside the reactor and has damaged- at least deformed other portions where the control rods where in place and prevented the neutron flow. . If deformed leaks resp gaps between the control rods and the nuclear fuel rods would cause the nuclear fission to start again within these damaged spots, A ll what has been reported since then ( the radiation send by the reactor rose exponential from 300 Microsievert in the first week after to 4- 5 millisievert in th second to 100 Millisievert one week later . Latest reports of June 2011 reported another rise to 4 Sievert near to reactor 1 . 1 rem = 0,01 Sv = 10 mSv.which is equivalent to ( 4 Sievert are 400 REM - roentgen equivalence measures- equal to 400 default röntgen machines which permenently work sent our radiation) . Thiss lets conclude that the overheated spots in the reactor cores widen and the small nuclear fissioon fire spreads slowly by and byto the other still intact fuel and control rod parts in the reactor cores ONly estimated 10 percent havwe meleted yet the other 90 is still in side the reactor cores will therefor inavertibly lead to a final catastrophy with a huge emission of radioactive isotops still to come if not more measurements are taken than right now.

At least the entire plant w shoud be secured and surrounded with a mmassive wall of iron construction elements concrete stones and so on so far that the entire plant can be set under water . Such a basin might be sufficiant to cool all reactors over one ore massive steel ship in the sea the cooling water is lead through either directly or by an heat exchanger system placed inside the huge pool.

On March 12 an hydrogen explosion destroyed the reactor building ( most likely the primary water cycle) of block 1., The reactor blocks 3 and 2 followed on March 14 , engulfing an radius of 30 km in thick steam. The melt of the partial meltdown had most likely burned t itself through all security hulls into the ground, while the most of the fuel rods where still in the reactor, whereby in the damaged oportions the nuclear fission continued

TEPCO the Japonese emergency management decided now permenently to lead seawater through all 3 damaged reactor blocks to prev ent the total meltdown. Due to highest radiation levels, operation shad to be repeatedly interrupted. Another problem made the spent fuel storage pools which contains each another hundred tons of spent fuel rods. Due to earlier prescription made by IAEA, these pools have to be connected to the reactors emergency cooling systems ( supression pool" below the reactor cores. ) , The heat from the bursted reactors now started to heat up this pools. Adsitional spraying machines had to be deployed to doll these pools from outside the bursted reactor buildings. Though the cooling capabilities could halfway sufficiantly cool the overheating reactors new complications took place : Due to the leaks in the reactor the water pumped through rose up in the building causing damages and leaks there and may finally cause outside walls to burst. After all, TEPCO and the operation teams is not much further than on the first day.

The water in the building was recently pumped into tanks and onto a ship , where it is partially decontaminated and c leaned form the salt to be pumped back through the reactors again . By this, TEPCO wants to install a permanent cooling system necessary to cool all 4 reactors at least for one year or more, until the activity has dropped so far that the reactor cores get accessible and the nuclear material can be removed.